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INTRODUCTION 
I decided on an investigation into the nature of Dubuffet's remarks con-
cerning the plight of the artist in modern societies, believing that the 
difficulties facing the artist are, at the time of this writing, stil l 
in force, and perhaps even more so now than they were in his day. These 
difficulties I believe, arise in the form of curtailments on personal 
and aesthetic freedoms brought about as the result of the artist's posi-
tion in, and conformity to, the norms and values of his society. The 
problem is I believe, that these value systems not only censor or curb 
artistic freedom but actually restrict all individual enterprises by 
demanding that the indi vidual conform to the greater wish of the group, 
at the expense of his own creative and individual potential. 
For me, a possible solution lies in the fact that the artist I indivi -
dual~ placement and degree of conformity within his group can be exam-
ined on two different levels, and need not therefore be seen as a static 
relationship. Firstly, we can conceive the situation more in its imme-
diate sense. On this level, we acknowledge ourselves as being members 
of a particular social group within a larger social structure and sec-
ondly, we can conceive ourselves as being but one small part of a great-
er scheme by acknowledging the universal and ignoring the particular. 
On the first level, our identity and behavioural patterns are in keeping 
wi th those of the group's and, in fact, are both, to some degree, af-
forded to us by the group. We familiarize ourselves with these given 
quali t ies by adj usting our behaviour to suit our image as it is projec-
ted to us from the group. Large parts of our identity make-up are moul-
ded for us by the group and, by accepting them, we subscribe to its 
norms and values which may, however, not necessarily be in our best 
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interests. On this first level of existence, we are, therefore, an en-
tity within a particular group within a particular local terrain, af-
fected by developments within our immediate vicinity. 
It was against this 'localized' or 'particular' group conformity that I 
believe Dubuffet reacted. He believed that it was possible to free him-
self from the conformity and demands of social order which he saw as an 
enemy of true creative ability. He believed that such a position within 
the group created an "antagonism" which" ... confounds the artist; here-
fuses to assume the pos iti on of 'alienation' implied by the creative 
activity, and vainly attempts to reconcile his work with a desire to be 
integrated into society and receive ... [its] ... honors and awards 
he said. (Rowell; 1973, p.22.) 
" 
It was thi s reaction against what I call the 'particular', and the im-
plied acknowledgement here of a less self conscious level (in terms of 
group image), attainable through the rejection of the local, which in-
terested me. Only on t hi s second level i s it possible to view ourselves 
not as a group-inspired entity, but as one unique spark of conscious-
ness resident in the greater scheme of human intelligence. By setting 
aside our cultural, racial or ethnic ('particular') differences, we can, 
I believe, concentrate purely on the truly individual characteristics 
which become visible at the second level, after the particulars of the 
local fall away. 
The maj or problem facing the indi vidual is therefore, to maintain his I 
her levels of original independence in the face of inhibiting agents 
(the 'particular') that impinge on their rights to free expression. At 
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this level then, it does not matter how or when or where we live, as es-
sentially, we all face the same problem - the attainment of a level of 
independence even if its form appears unsuitable to the group. 
Dubuffet also encouraged an attack on set mental or social attitudes by 
declaring these invalid and therefore open to re-definition . In this 
instance therefore, we must not apply our own 1particular 1 group concep-
tions to the terms 1freedom 1, 1individuality1 or 10bjectivity1, but 
should try to embrace all possible fields of action implied. Anti-
social, barbaric or degenerate behaviours are only valid in terms of 
our own socialization process, which, as I mentioned, is adopted be-
cause it works within our particular group setting. Removed from the 
group, we might find that these standards allow for a re-interpreta-
tion into a manner more suited to our personal needs. All values, moral 
codes or codes of ethics are thus relative only to our communal or 1par-
ticular1 setting and can be viewed as restraining or censoring agents by 
individual perceptions. Above all, they can be seen to act as an enemy 
to all true creative ability. 
It was in this context that I chose to investigate Dubuffet 1s anticul-
tural positions and, in particular , his belief in what he called 11 ••• 
the superiority of the anti-social alienated artist who creates for his 
own personal satisfaction.~~ (Rowell; 1973, p.21.) 
Another field of interest I wish to address in this essay was the issue 
of our society1s present lack of a spiritual base, and how this in it-
self has affected the very course and nature of art. The loss of are-
ligious or spi ritual base has largely been responsible for the adoption 
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of many of the value systems that I have alluded to. (These will be 
elaborated on in the course of this discussion). I do not however pro-
pagate a return to the Pre-Renaissance religious codes which were, in 
fact, more freedom curtailing than any group-pressure we feel today, but 
acknowledge that, with little or no uniform or personal spiritual sub-
stance, our lives are empty. The gradual emptying of our lives in the 
face of sc ience and religious skepticism has resulted in the present set 
attitudes and standards which have their counterpart in the aesthetic 
sensibilities of our age, both of which demand a degree of conformity 
from the arti st I individual. To obtain any degree of freedom, however, 
does not mean the loss of responsibility but, I believe, an increase in 
personal responsibility. Without any system of personal belief, freedom 
will lead t o boredom and even nothingness. In such an instance, the 
confines of the social group will always appear more attractive. 
By way of a solution, Dubuffet has much to offer in that his propaga-
tion of a value system closer to that which inspired the primitive, can 
be seen in the context of Dr. Carl Jung's ideas on what I would like to 
call the 'universality of man'. In other terms it can be expressed as 
a shared psychic heritage common to humanity, which provides us with 
access to the world of myth and symbol as explored by our ancestors 
through their art and magic. It can, likewise, provide us with the nec-
essary subst ance on which t o rebuild our own personal (yet shared) spi-
ritual mode, replacing what is lacking in our lives, while at the same 
time, providing the artist with an appropriate field of exploration. 
A careful study of Dubuffet ' s concepts will, I hope, highlight these 
shortcomings and inadequacies in our present Western societies. I also 
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hope to show how twentieth century arts accurately mirror these short-
comings which have ultimately led to a curtailment of the artistic free-
doms of our generat ion. This predicament, together with the factors 
that have contr ibuted to its present state, will therefore be discussed 
in more detail. The alternatives that Dubuffet has offered will also be 
looked at more closely. 
11 8ut the world was no longer open to a transcendent GJd. It 
had become a closed box, and man was caught in that box ... 
(Rookmaaker; 1970, p.47.) 
For many, the world they live in has lost its meaning. Their relation 
to their universe and their participation in it, are experienced as 
being without thread or fou~dation in that, they no longer perceive the 
links that bind them to God and to the world around them. (Those which 
gave their existence meaning.) Their world has in fact become a chequer-
board on which they are moved involuntarily through the game called life. 
The moves to which they feel they are entitled are, birth, procreation, 
and death, all else seems to make little sense. They therefore make the 
best of their situation by making their lives as comfortable as possible, 
by amusing themselves will all our technological age has to offer. 
These feelings, attitudes, and experiences of emptiness, are generally 
most prevalent amongst the large middle class societies of the Western 
World. It was they, that in the eighteenth century, were the most threa-
tened by the advent of the Enlightenmeni. They felt a dismay, and more 
importantly, feelings of insecurity and futility when faced with the new 
principles of the coming scientific age which stood to challenge t heir 
established ways. In defense, they began to cement for themselves a new 
and more tangible reality based in materialism and the power of acquisi-
tion. Their procurement of status through wealth provided them with a 
1. "The Enlightenment was a movement of thought and belief concerned 
with the interrelated concepts of God, reason, nature and man that c laim-
ed wide assent among European intellectuals in the Seventeenth and Eight-
eenth centuries. Although diverse in emphasis and interests, the En-
lightenment attacked the established ways of European life .. .. " (Bri -
tannica; 1986, p.755.) 
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renewed 1 sense of importance, albeit only in the eyes of their fellow 
men. 
Their reaction has culminated in today~ consumer generation who have, 
unwittingly, placed themselves in the hands of a system which they ini-
tially created to curb their sense of futility and uprootedness from 
their older, more established order. What has actually happened, is 
that modern man now finds himself at the mercy of a system which con-
fines him, in that it curbs the individuals freedom of choice. John 
Berger recognized this fact when he spoke of our society 1 s propensity 
to, 11 ••• recognise nothing except the power to acquire. All other human 
faculties or needs are made subsidiary to this power, ... 11 he said. 11 All 
hopes are gathered together, made homogeneous, simplified ... . No other 
kind of hope or satisfaction or pleasure can any longer be envisaged 
with the culture of capitalism. 11 (Berger; 1972, p.153.) He saw our 
capitalist society as therefore guilty of restricting freedom of choice 
by forcing the majority, whom it exploits, into narrowing their inte-
rests and choices to the limitations of publicity images. 
What of the individuals need to recognise the uniqueness, and strength, 
of his own seperate identity, apart from the large collectivisms which 
provide 1 identities 1 through membership of clubs, organizations, and even 
philosophies, religions and ideologies? These collective identi ties in-
terfere with the process of individuation, according to Jung, who says 
membership of these should be seen only as an intermediary stage on the 
1. 11The transformation of a merchant estate into a capitalist class cap-
able of imagining itself as a political and not just an economic force 
required centuries to complete and was not, in fact legitimated until the 
English revolution of the Seventeenth century and the French revolution 
of the Eighteenth century. 11 (Parlgrave; 1987, p.348.) 
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way to individuation. He warns however, 11 it would be wrong to re-
gard this intermediary stage as a trap; on the contrary, for a long time 
to come it will represent the only possible form of existence for the in-
dividual, who nowadays seems more than ever threatened by anonymity. 
Collective organization is still so essential to-day that many consider 
it, with some justification to be the final goal." (Jung; 1985, p.375.) 
Dubuffet, it will be seen, came to distrust all collective identities and 
to regard them as mere tools of our present day culture which he equates 
with indoctrination, in that he sees it acting like a filter. It sifts 
out and discards anything, or anyone, opposed to the norm. Its main 
function , he says, is to make uniform in order that it preserve the sta-
tus quo. 
Dubuffet, as a result, felt that a degree of isolation was necessary to 
curb the inhibiting effect our culture has on the process of individua-
tion, as he experienced it. 
But why we may ask has this trend towards collectivity become so marked 
in our society, and should it be seen as a trap for the individual? The 
answer to the first part of the question is that society, as we know it, 
is losing its unifying threads, resulting in a degree of diversification 
and disharmony. "Man today is in revolt against the world in which he 
lives," says Rookmaaker, ''agai nst its dehumanizing tendencies, against 
slavery under the bosses of the new Galbraith elite, under a computerized 
bureaucracy, against al ienation and the loneliness of the mass man. He 
searches frantically for a new world. He is willing to risk the hardship 
of revolution. The tragedy is that man has no new principles to offer. 
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All his endeavours result only in a world which is even more consistent 
with the principles of the Enlightenment, of autonomous man." (Rook-
maaker; 1970, p. 196.) An autonomous man, yet one who is alone, afraid, 
and isolated from the natural world around him, and even more impor-
tantly, isolated from himself. 
The revolt leads man therefore not to greater unity, but as in the great 
Revolutions of our time, to greater entrapment than before. It leaves 
man with the feeling that he is losing his humanity, that is, his per-
sonality and individuality. The result is the neurotic modern man. The 
neurosis Dubuffet believes, is the result of the annihilation of man~ 
primal unity with his universe" ... by the artificial conventions andre-
pressions of his so-called civilization •... " (Rowell; 1973, p.17.) 
But how may we ask could it have been any different? How could we have 
made it possible to make the transition into the 'new age' whilst still 
retaining, what many consider to be old world beliefs, that is, reli-
gion, spirituality, or any form of connectedness with the natural world 
around us. Jung believes that this could have been, and is still pos-
sible, if we recognize the thread inherent in all of us which links us 
" . . . by myth with the world of the ancestors, and thus with nature truly 
experienced and not merely seen from the outside, " (Jung; 1985, 
p.166.) The world as experienced from the outside, is one that has be-
come dehumanized, one in which man no longer feels involved in, one with 
which he has lost his "emotional" and "unconscious identity" with. 
(Jung; 1978, p.85.) The natural world and its phenomena e. g. thunder, 
lightning, no longer have any symbolic significance to him. He therefore 
experiences himself to be isolated from the cosmos. 
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Oubuffet was to a large extent influenced in this regard by the work of 
Or. Hans Prinzhorn, whose book, 11 Artistry of the Mentally Ill, 11 here-
ceived as a gift in 1923. Prinzhorn•s theories were , in turn, influ-
enced by the philosopher and psychologist Ludwig Klages 1 who viewed man 
from the perspective of his inescapable links with, as well as his depen-
dence on, his animal self and its surroundings . Prinzhorn held the view 
however, that man, through his use of language , abstract thought and rea-
son, had destroyed any links with his animal self. This had resulted in 
an imbalance which held man poised between the role of his assertive con-
scious life , and that of his deeper inner self. This imbalance, he said, 
had caused a state of psychic weakness in man which, ultimately, could be 
seen as the cause of his neurosis. 
This neurosis, stemming from feelings of alienation, leads him therefore 
toward collectivisms, with whose help he at least feels a sense of com-
munity and security. In this instance, collectivisms can be regarded as 
a trap as they merely provide the illusion of that which is truly lack-
ing, and so, can be seen as what Jung so aptly calls, 11 ••• crutches for 
the lame, shields for the timid, beds for the lazy . .. ~ndJ ... nurseries 
f or the irresponsible; .... 11 (Jung; 1985, p.375.) 
In terms of this discussion then, and in particular, in keeping with the 
relevancy of Oubuffet•s ideas on the present position of the artist in 
society, we may ask (if this general summation of the present condition 
1. 11 Human life for Klages differed from animal life in general by virtue 
of t he emergence in man of spirit (Geist); man•s capacity to think and to 
will provided the source of his estrangement from the world and the cause 
of his particular psychic ill ness } ' (Collier-Macmillan; 1967, p.344.) 
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of Western societies is correct) how this effects the position of the 
artist, and are these shortcomings reflected in our arts? 
Firstly though, let us consider this statement by Verstra~te, who be-
believes that; 11 In a sense a relationship of tension exists. The artist 
does not work in a vacuum: if he depends on society for his livelihood 
he is obliged to some extent to cater to its tastes. On the other hand, 
the greatest art is generally the creation of individual s and thus stands 
in psychological opposition to the crowd, to the people in all their as-
pects of normality and mass action. 11 (Verstra~te; n.d., p.1.) 
It will be seen that this statement pertains directly to Dubuffet 1 s views 
on alienation, in that, if the observations regarding the artist 1 s posi-
tion in society are correct, then, his response can be interpreted as 
legitimate and even necessary. 
So, do the arts accurately reflect the current state of our society and 
its culture? The answer to th is question must always be yes, in that, 
an artists work is always part product of his own individuality, and part 
product of his age, to which he reacts either consciously or unconsci-
ously. His 11 personal psychology11 allows him therefore to 11 ••• give form 
to the nature and values of his time, which in their turn, fo rm him. 11 
(Jaffe; 1978, p.285,286.) The artist is therefore,the representative, 
as well as the 11 victim11 , of what Jung calls, 11 ••• a collective spirit 
whose years are counted in centur ies . 11 (Jung ; 1985, p.111.) 
How then has the artist mirrored the disharmony inherent in our culture 
tn the arts? To answer we need to look at modern art in general and to 
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examine two of its most evident characteristics, namely, 
i) it's abstraction, and 
ii) it's great stylistic variation. 
It's abstraction can be explained by virtue of the fact that it was an 
intellectually conceived approach, that is, it is a cerebral search for 
a new order often based in geometric form. In this respect, it was in 
keeping with the Western rationalist tradition which has been used as a 
defense against the 11 Superstitions 11 of primitive and medieval man. It 
has also resulted in the loss of our ability 11 ••• to respond to numinous 
symbols and ideas, ... 11 which has caused the total di s integration of our 
spiritual beliefs. (Jung; 1978, p.84.) 
The loss of spiritual values as a result of rationalisms or intellec-
tuali sms, together with its consequences, can perhaps be more readily 
observed in a primitive society whose members become exposed to modern 
civilization. The results are that; 11 Its people lose the meaning of 
their lives, their social organization disintegrates, and they themselves 
morally decay. 11 (Jung; 1978, p.84.) Intellectualisms, or logical ex-
planations by way of reason, allow no room for the metaphysical vision. 
They impose an inflexible grid on reality in order to explain it in a 
rational way. Abstraction, similarly, was a logical attempt to find a 
hidden order behind the real world, for example, Cezanne's cones, cyl in-
ders and spheres. 
Regarding the tremendous stylistic confusion it has been suggested that 
this 11 ••• reflects the lack of any broad unified outlook or widely ac -
cepted system of values in modern Western societies. 11 (VerstraHe, n.d., 
p. 12.) The beginnings of this diversity inherent to twentieth century 
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arts can be traced back to the post war period of 1946 - 1949. A new 
generation of American artists led by exiled European artists, among 
them Marchel Duchamp, started filling the vacuum Europe was experiencing 
as a result of post-war disruption and feelings of disillusionment. The 
American avante-garde exported the trends, ism's, and overnight success 
stories with which we have by now all become familiar, and which in them-
selves, were and still are, a true reflection of the society they were 
born in. 
Both the qualities of abstraction and stylistic diversity born in the 
eruptions of the first half of our century, are therefore evident in the 
art of our century. Both therefore, can be seen as a direct expression 
of the anxiety of our age brought about as a result of upheaval and the 
subsequent loss of spiritual values. 
It has been suggested however that; "Man's spiritual needs are as basic 
to humanity as his creativity. If society does not satisfy both the 
artist is forced to withdraw into himself, " (Verstra~te; n.d., 
abstract.) It will be seen that this premise pertains directly to Du-
buffet's views on alienation, it is why he propagated a state of self-
imposed isolation for himself, and also as a pre-requisite for any 'true' 
creative action. It was proposed also as the result of a critical eva-
luation of current norms and values in an attempt, on his behalf, to in-
terpret his world into a more personal and meaningful way. For a model 
he looked back to a time when man, that is, society, existed in a state 
of unity with the cosmos, a union that was sustained at its centre by 
deep religious and spiritual values. A union to which the artist was 
deeply committed and subsequently played an integral part in. The model 
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he looked to was that of primitive societies. 
11 In primitive and archaic societies the question of responsibility and 
even of art itself was not consciously posed. The artist assumed his 
role in society quite naturally, because art and society worked hand 
in hand. Art was not peripheral to life, but an intensification of 
it ... . It wa s a vital activity and an embodiment of the tribal spirit 
and communa l soul. The primal man and artist was hardly conscious of 
individuality. He existed in a state of communion with the cosmos, his 
gods and his fellowmen. Artistic creation, like magic, was a path to-
wards unity, a ritual by which myths \vere given concrete meaning. 11 ( Ver-
st r a ~t e; n. d. , p. 2, 3. ) 
By comparison, Dubuffet highlighted the disparity between our Western 
Cu lture and that of a primitive society. In Position One1 of his anti-
cultural stance, he alludes to the degree of discontinuity which he feels 
exists between Western man and his environment, as opposed to the unity 
that existed between primitive man and his surroundings . 
In an attempt to reach a similar position of cohesion, Dubuffet, in his 
painting, removes man from his elevated lodgings and depicts him as al-
most indistinguishable from his surroundings . Consequently, in his por-
traits, Dubuffet robs man of his personality thereby affording him a 
greater degree of anonymity. 11 He proceeds in the same way as those naive 
draftsmen .. .[childrenJ- .. 11 says Cordier, 11 ... who only represent indivi-
duals by generalized signs in wh ich they alone can detect any resem-
1. See Appendix. 
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blance.'' (Cordier; 1960, n.p.) Dubuffet believed that by stripping a 
person of his individuality, he could eliminate such categories as ap-
pearance, and position, thereby placing man in a position of similtude 
wi th his surroundings; more akin to the posit ion a primitive wou l d af-
ford him. 
It must be noted here however, that the 'personality' or 'indiv i dual-
ness ' that Dubuff et attempts to strip from modern man, i s that identity 
which has been afforded him by the larger collect ive organizat ion of his 
society or culture. It is therefore not one that he has truly experi-
enced as his own . In contrast , if we examine the unity that existed be-
tween primit i ve man and his tr i be, we know that it was far more rest r i-
ctive or binding, in the sense that the individuality of tribal members 
were collectivized to a far greater extent than anything we could experi-
ence today. But , if one looks (as Dubuffet does) at the collective iden-
tity or communal soul of a tribe and its relation to its world around it , 
we witness by contrast, exact ly what is lacking and therefore at the root 
of our feelings of disorientation with our world. 
Dubuffet tried to adopt a s imilar approach in his thinking by attempti ng 
to disband the categories and classifications, inherent to our way of 
thinking. He expl ains; "What man calls his intelligence, which he's so 
proud of, does not seem to me to be such a precious privilege as he be-
lieves. Man has his own special ways of facing up to the world and 
representing it to himself, ways that are clearly very different from 
those of a frog or a herring: but I don't see anything which proves that 
they are better. Besides, the very idea of better , super ior or inferior 
only has foundation in man's way of looking at things, and he wi l l nat-
11 
urally consider superior that which is similar to himself .... We rebel 
against any attempt to compare the form that the human mind has taken 
on, and which we think of as intelligence, to the form that might exist 
in the mind of a gas, or of sulphur. But we are forced to admit that 
there is the same flux in all different kinds of beings, including man, 
the frog and su lphur." (Novarina; 1983, p.22.) 
Dubuffet's ideal can thus be seen to be indicative of a state of equa-
lity between man and nature, whatever its substance. This anti-humanist, 
'anthropomorphic' state, could only exist by acknowledging the idea, that 
we (man) are of equal privilege and importance amongst the other inhabi-
tants of our world. By attempting to destroy the myth of man's supreme 
importance, and re-establishing a communion between man and nature, Du-
buffet hoped to arrive at a situation which was more akin with the" ... 
religious manifestations of the primitive people, ... "as expressed thro-
ugh their art and customs. (Cordier; 1960, n.p.) 
Ironically though, he realized that to establish any degree of contin-
uity between himself, society and nature, he firstly had to withdraw from 
society in order to reach his objective. Society was not satisfying his 
needs, nor as the evidence put forward suggests, was it satisfying huma-
nity's needs, so the only alternative left was to distance himself from 
it, in order to set about establishing a new order. 
Dubuffet formulated his anticultural positions in 1951 with the aim to 
providing an alternative value system to the Humanist1 tradition, which 
1. "The age-old quest of religion and philosophy is the search for a 
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has been fundamental to our culture since the Renaissance. Dubuffet be-
lieved that it was an opportune time for a movement away from Humanist 
ideology (which it will be seen has largely been responsible for the 
present state of our Western societ ies) toward a new system of values, 
more akin to those of primitive cultures . 
The reliance on , and belief in our intellectual powers, reached a high-
point during the Renaissance when man, once and for all, unsurped the 
power of the church and assumed his place at the centre of the universe. 
Now, '' ... t he laws of mechanics and causality became the foundations of 
sc ience. The world of religious feeling , of the irrational, and of mys-
ticism, which had played so great a part in medieva l times, was more and 
more submerged by the triumphs of logical thought." (Jaffe; 1978, p. 
274.) "The age of scient ific enquiry overcame the medieval heritage of 
mysticism and faith ." ( VerstraHe; n.d., p.6. ) 
It can therefore be seen that Art became less religious, and more occu-
pied with the visib le, that is, the tangible. Aestheticism replaced t he 
religious as the new emphasis fell on representational form. Only that 
which was immed i ately detectable to the senses was afforded a reality 
in the new scope of things. These two opposing forms of representat ion 
have been described as being, "the imagi nati ve" and the "sensory" style. 
(Jaffe; 1978, p.278.) The sensory style we can ally with realism as it 
concentrates only on that which is immediately vis ible, while the ima-
centre from which we can look at the world and relate ourselves to our 
total environment . Re l igion places God at the centre; Humanism places 
Man ... [ at the centre]." (Hawton; 1963, p.68.) Humani sm is "aimed at 
directing attention away from theoret ical speculation about God to the 
study of works of man as revealed in hi story, literature and art." (Qui-
nton; 1983, p.292.) 
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ginative style allies itself to the conceptual, or that which the artist 
conceives of through his senses, dreams, visions etc. Its form or re-
presentations, are therefore not reliant on 'realistic' renditions, but 
open to the artist's own personal interpretation . 
A good example of what is meant by "imaginable", would be the representa-
t ion of angels, which lost their place in painting (and also in the new 
rational world) after the adoption of linear perspective by Alberti in 
1435. Linear perspective, which it has been suggested, was the artist's 
preparation for the coming scientific age , has become for modern man what 
is termed " ... a cultural style of li ving ... [hat i s~ . .. linear 
perspective vision." (Romanyshyn; n.d., p.2.) This is es pecia lly true 
when one considers how much it changed man's perception of his world. 
In the construction of linear perspective, Alberti always drew a rec-
tangle which he " ... regard[ed]as an open window through which the sub-
j ect to be painted is seen; .... " (Romanyshyn; n.d., p.4.) Into this rec-
tangle he then always placed the figure of a man which he divided in three 
equal parts. The base line of his "window" was then divided into as many 
of these parts as i t could hold. From these marks, convergent lines were 
then drawn to a vanishing point situated on the horizon line, which was 
always placed at the same height as the top of the figure's head. 
This construction can be said to have altered our vision of our world 
in that, 
i) it firstly assumes that we the viewers look out onto our world 
as if through a window. This si ngl e point perspective (apart 
from its brief attack during cubism) has become entrenched as 
the manner in which we now perceive our world. 
14 
ii) The construction of the vanishing point provided for a hori-
zontal depth, that is, a horizontal recession away from the 
viewer. Together with the viewer therefore, all objects which 
were to be represented in the painting were placed on this 
plane. This allowed for only one 11 ••• level or plane of exis-
tence . Things, or beings, which belong to different levels of 
existence .. . like angels in Medieval landscapes .. -[would]. .. 
progressively lose their place in the space of this world. 11 
(Romanyshyn; n.d., p.6.) 
iii ) The si ze of objects are therefore measured according to their 
distance away from us, and no longer as an indication of their 
importance. 
iv) We the viewer, are immobile, we are fixed in a position from 
which we gaze out onto the world unlike the earlier artist, 
prior to the invention of linear perspective, who painted the 
experience of what it was like to walk about through his world. 
The opposite of linear perspective which has been referred to 
as 11 ••• reverse perspective .•. in which the sides of objects 
diverge rather than converge toward the vanishing point, ... 11 is 
used by primitive artists, Eastern cultures, Medieval art and 
children, whose example Dubuffet followed and propagated, as 
an alternative to our 11 way of seeing, 11 (that is, our linear 
perspective vision.) (Romanyshyn; n.d., p.15.) 
The Renaissance therefore brought about radical changes in firstly, man 1 s 
view of reality, and secondly, in his society. The religious and mysti-
cal base of his existence fell away as his art was no longer bound by 
religious values. The humanism and empiricism started by the Greeks had 
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now gained a firm foothold in the West. The artist now explored his 
own individual caprice within the context of his patronage by the Church 
and the rich. His position in society was now changing in that, he was 
now being accorded a different status from other men. He was, as Vers-
tra~te puts it, now" ... no longer responsible for upholding the t rans-
cendental values of society because these were on the wane: he responded 
to the tastes of small groups." (VerstraHe ; n.d., p.6.) 
These developments set the stage for the situations of elitism and care-
erism which have reached their climax in the arts of the twentieth cen-
tury. Art today, it has been suggested, has become " ... the monopoly 
of the privileged ... [and of a system whic~ ... is sustained at the 
centre by a cultural ideal that is untouchable and inalterable, based 
as it is on the unshakeable belief in such things as 'our cultural heri-
tage', 'the legacy of the past' and the fetish of the 'great master-
piece'.'' (Cardinal; 1972, p.9.) 
These conditions have also made it inconceivable that art can exist any-
where else but in galleries, museums and private collections. It can 
also be said that art today has become accessible only to the initiated 
few, in that, alongside each movement and its art works, resides the 
artistic conventions necessary for an understanding of those works . A 
person can therefore make assumptions regarding a work of art only as 
the result of his or her particular cultural education. Furthermore, 
cultural conditioning i s such, that nobody disputes its decisions and 
value judgements . Works like Mark Rothko's Orange Yellow Orange (1969) 
or Jackson Pollock's Lavender Mist (1950) can only be understood by per-
sons of trained sensibilities, persons who have been taught to appreciate 
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the conventions of such works. 
In this way art in the twentieth century is no longer the expression of 
a shared mode of being but, rather the domain of the individual and the 
result of 
i) our society losing its co-ordinated structure and 
ii) the arts becoming the retreat of the individual as well as a 
marketable commodity, whose creator is accorded an enviable pos-
ition of high status. 
One of the ultimate myths perpetuated by our cultural education is the 
value the artist places on the recognition he may be able to achieve, 
says Dubuffet. The result is, that artists today have become more con-
cerned with producing marketable commodities and are thereby negating the 
true function of art, (to give vent to, and lend expression to, the work-
ings of the innermost self.) This could be sa id to be the result of an 
overcrowded, over-inflated art market. The overcrowding results in 
fierce competition which has resulted in "careerism", while an inflated 
market results in "fashion" and" ... eye-catching stylistic device[s] .. 
" (Hughes; 1985, p.63.) 
Dubuffet therefore divides artworks into two distinct categories. Fir-
stly he says, there is an artform which conforms and submits to the cul-
tural norm, what he calls "social art 11 • This art he believes conforms 
to, and is acted upon by the aesthetic criteria which the artist em-
ploys, so as to be able to evaluate his work in terms of its monetary 
worth. Secondly,Dubuffet lists those works that are created solely 
for the artists own ends, without him entertaining th~ least intention 
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that he be rewarded for them. Most of the artists represented in his 
collection of Art brut1 fall into this category. 
Dubuffet rejects the idea that an artist needs as a prerequisite, know-
ledge of art history and subsequently looks to artists who have had lit-
tle or no schooling, who in cultural terms are uncultured . He repudiates 
the tendency by art historians to evaluate new works only in terms of 
what has gone before them. This deconstructionist approach builds a 
sequential advancement of styles each bearing an influence on, and even-
tually culminating in, the present. It also presupposes, says Dubuffet, 
that the artist is well versed in the history of art, and that he creates 
within the chronological framework of movements and styles . Works that a 
succession of art historians labelled as masterpieces and subsequently 
have come to be prized as amongst mans most important achievements, are 
merely the product of a 'particular' cultural, social and psychological 
prejudice. They therefore ignore and reject a host of configurations 
which at the time, did not conform to their prevailing, 'particular' 
aesthetic conventions. The result of such a system is that it deadens 
creative inst inct, says Dubuffet, in that all creativity under the pre-
sent system is channeled along set avenues, and always judged in accor-
dance with what has gone before. 
Thus aestheticism, professionalism and marketability, all with their 
roots in the Renaissance, have led to a situation today in which now more 
so than ever, the artist aims at an audience, albeit an elitist one, on 
which he must make an impression if he is to survive. What followed in 
1. See pages 29- 31. 
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the latter half of the eighteenth century however, increased and cement-
ed the artists and his fellow mans sense of estrangement from his world. 
The artist, already aiming toward careerism, found himself reflecting on 
the world of reason, the natural sciences, and above all, a world from 
which myth, mysticisms and the metaphysical had been banished once and 
for all. 
The Enlightenment of the eighteenth century has been described as, among 
other things, " ... the resurgence of the principles of Humanism, II 
and; "The rise of rationalism or scientific enquiry into material real-
ity." (Rookmaaker; 1970, p.43.) (Verstra~te; n.d., p.7.) It took the 
form of an investigation into the world around us using the principles 
of empirism. Its object was to understand nature and its governing 
principles. Based as it was on empirism, it therefore excluded from 
man's register anything other than what the senses could record, and 
that our intelligence (reason) could understand. Thus, everything from 
God's existence to moral codes were re-examined under that scrupulous 
arbitrator, scientific fact. Needless to say, God, whose experience is 
neither recorded by sense perception nor by reason, was not accorded any 
role of significance in this new age. To replace God and His word, Hob-
bes wrote his social contract while Diderot, and later Darwin, determined 
that man was subject to the same natural laws as all the other creatures 
on this planet which themselves, could be studied and understood with 
scientific methods. 
Epistemology, the theory of the method of knowledge, came to replace on-
tology, a field of philosophy centred on " ... the theory of being: how 
is the world structured, what is the place of man in it?" (Rookmaaker; 
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1970; p.45.) Epistemology was concerned with understanding our position 
in the universe by 11 ••• us[ing]our senses (seeing, hear ing, weighing, 
measuring) and usQng]our reason to coordinate the sensations or 
perceptions we have had." (Rookmaaker; 1970, p.45.) 
Prior to the age of reason, man knew his place in the universe and under-
stood the importance of his being. Now it was supposedly proved that 
man was merely an animal living in a world that like him, ran according 
to natural cycles of life and death, with nothing coming before, nothing 
more than instinctual behaviour during, and nothing after death. Man 
therefore became naturalized, a trait that continued on into the nine-
teenth century. What this means is that man had by now been reduced to 
inst inct, survival of the fittest and a will to live. Science, which 
was responsible for his new position, was accorded almost religious sta-
tus by the rationalists who regarded it as the source of all knowledge. 
The twentieth century saw further advances in the field of science in an 
effort to make the world a better place to live in, with technology the 
tool and man a technocratic consumer. 
We now reach the point at which we started this discussion, that of man 
in the box, that is, man without meaning. All the events up to 1942, 
(the date at which Dubuffet, aged fourty one, was financially secure 
enough to take up painting again and to commit himself entirely to art) 
played an important role in the moulding of his outlook, and in deter-
mining the stance he would take philosophically and artistically. Du-
buffet echoed the feelings of disenchantment reflected in the writings 
of artists and philosophers of the time, a skepticism resulting from a 
general feeling of loss in meaning and purpose in life. 
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Born in Le Harve France in 1901, Dubuffet, along with many of his con-
temporaries felt that after the catastrophe of World War II, they needed 
to abandon the values of their present system , which had led their world 
along its path to almost ultimate destruction. They therefore declared 
the previous tendencies toward rationalism and empiricism inapropriate, 
and subsequently involved themselves in a search for new and radical al-
ternatives. Their direction lay more toward the irrational, " ... for ... " 
as Rookmaaker says " rationalism is the ma in principle of the box -
and irrationality means unreasonable, undiscussable, being understood 
neither by reason nor by science. " (Rookmaaker; 1970, p.48.) 
Existentialism in particular evolved as a reaction to the" .. . material 
and spi ritual destruction ... " of Europe during the Second World War, 
and subsequent ly against what has been called the optimism of Romantic 
inspiration of the nineteenth century" ... by which the destiny of man 
.. . [wa~··· infallibly guaranteed by an infinite force (such as Reason, 
the Absolute, or Mind)." (Collier-Macmillan; 1967, p.264.) 
Existentialism by contrast stressed" ... the instability and the risk 
of all human reality, ·· · Gnd] ... acknowledge[d]that man, ... his ... 
determinism . .. [an~· · · his very freedom is cond itioned and hampered 
by limitations that could at any moment render it empty." For the Exis-
tentialists therefore" . . . the projection of existence implie[d]risks, 
renunciation, and limitation. Among the risk, the most serious ... 
~a~··· man 1s descent into authenticity, . .. his degradation from 
a person into a thi ng 1. If focuses therefore on the negative and "baf-
1. The situation reached in which your existence is no longer acknow-
ledged by your fellow man. 
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fling" qualities of man's situation, that i s, " . .. death, and the strug-
gle and suffering inherent in every form of l ife ... the guilt inherent 
in the limitation of choices and in the responsibilities that derive 
from making them; the boredom from the repitition of situations; the 
absurdity of man' s dangling between the infinity of his aspirations and 
the finitude of his poss i bilities." (Collier-Macmillan; 1967, p.264.) 
The novels and plays of Jean-Pau l Satre, Simone de Beauvoir and Albert 
Camus contained these theses, which had their analogies in Surrealism 
and Expressionism, both of which as movements, were more concerned with 
the expression of man's inner reality , as opposed to depictions of their 
outer external world. Although Dubuffet never aligned himself with the 
Surrealists, he was undoubtedly i nfluenced by the movement, part icularly 
one of its members, Max Jacob, with whom he became friendly in the 
1920 IS. 
The Surrealists, like Dubuffet, renounced categorical thought. In the 
Second Surreal i st Manifesto of 1930 Andre Breton stated; "There is every 
reason to believe that there exists a point in the mind where life and 
death, the real and the imaginery, the past and the future, the communi-
cable and the non-communicable, the above and the below, cease to be per-
ceived as contradictions." (Rowell; 1937, p.19.) The Surrealists sought 
to find and explore this site of non-contradiction through an induced 
state of consciousness which produced " ... hallucinatory images of sur-
reality ... " (Rowell; 1973, p.20.) For Dubuffet, the answer lay not in 
sur-reality, but in a position which surpassed subjectivity, that is, 
the visions and delusions of an ordinary un-selfconscious consciousness. 
What he was seeking was the opposite of heroic, a vision conceived of in 
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the terms of an average ordinary man, expressed in a language so direct 
that anyone could understand his message. 
He therefore questioned the validity of our cultures emphasis on the 
rational and logical, and adopted his anticultural stance which he be-
lieved could be responsible for a re-generation of meaning, resulting 
in the re-establishment of a sense of purpose and belonging. 
In his third anticultural posit ion, Dubuffet questions the validity of 
the Western W:lrlds emphasis on reason and logic. He also displays a 
distrust for the notion that elaborate thought be exalted as the highest 
example of mental functioning. Roger Cardinal attributes to elaborate 
thought the patterns that have led to" ... the vertical structure of cul-
ture ... [and] ... the hierarchical pyramid of official values .... " 
(Cardinal; 1972, p.27.) Dubuffet likens elaborate thought to a spiral 
ladder, in which, each rung corresponds to the progressive stages reached 
by an idea as it spirals upwards becoming weaker, and more impoverished, 
the higher it gets. By contrast though, he believed horizontal and 'lat-
eral'1 thought to be far richer, as it displayed more originality and a 
greater degree of the unexpected. He believed it contains greater free-
doms, won as a result of the disintegration of categorical thought, to-
gether with more of the irrational and the illogical. 
1. Horizontal or "lateral thinking is quite distinct from vertical 
thinking which is the traditional type of thinking . In vertical think-
ing one moves forward by sequential steps each of which must be justi-
fied ... [as each step] ... ri ses directly from the preceeding step to 
which it is firmly connected. With Lateral thinking the steps do not 
have to be sequential." (De Bono; 1977, p. 39.) "Lateral thinking makes 
quite different use of information from logical (vertical thinking). For 
instance, the need to be right at every step is absolutely essential to 
logical thinking but quite unnecessary in lateral thinking .... With log-
ical t hinking one may delay j udgements in order to allow information to 
interact and generate new ideas." (De Bono; 1977, p. 258. ) 
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Dubuffet also found comfort observing and listening to conversations 
of simple folk. For th i s reason he frequently vis ited the Paris flea 
market where he witnessed, what he believed were patterns of thought and 
behaviour closer to a grass roots level - closer to their source. These 
he termed examples of 11 true nature. (Cardinal ; 1960 , p.27 . ) He ex-
pl ains; 11 Personal ly I have no interest in the exceptional, whatever its 
field may be. My fare is the ordinary. The more trivial, the more I 
like it ... what I want to find in my pictures is the gaze of a comple-
tely average and ord i nary man . 11 (Franzke; 1976, p.156.) 
In position three, Dubuffet offers us an alternative to the advancement 
of a system of hierarchical imperatives wh ich govern our thought pro-
cesses , and make up the structure of our officia l value systems . In so 
doi ng, he propagates the use of alternate channels, as a means to in-
crease creativity and oringinality in the individual. As mentioned, 
his alternative was based largely on the model of primitive societies, 
whose members enjoyed the communion of a collective spirit sustained 
at its centre by ritual myth and symbo l ism. 
Their existence, although strictly communal, was richly adorned by their 
sense of belonging, and interaction with, the cosmic forces of their 
numinous universe. Their art was vital to their community as through its 
graphic representation, rituals, hunts and magic were performed and sym-
bolized. The primitive artist therefore, had no qualms about what to 
paint, or how to paint. He painted his world as he experienced it , with-
out a thought for aesthetics (beauty) competition, or reward. When Dr. 
Hans Prinzhorn therefore made the assertion that artworks by children, 
the mentally ill and primitives, all conformed to the same 11 ••• elemen-
24 
tary art i stic process 11 which he believed was inherent to all men, 
Dubuffet began to ask why it was that twentieth century man seemed to 
lack such an instinct? (Cardinal; 1972, p.19.) 
Dr. Prinzhorn's findings were the result of a three year study of art-
works produced by the mentally ill, and were published under the title 
11 Art i stry of the Mentally Ill." Prinzhorn, who was appointed assistant 
to the ch ief psychiatrist of the Heidelberg Psychiatric Clinic in 1918, 
was encouraged by hi s senior to begin a research investigation of paint-
ings and drawings executed by mental patients. Prinzhorn subsequently 
spent three years collecting artworks from psychiatric institutions in 
Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Italy and the Netherlands, before publish-
ing hi s findings in 1922. 
His findings convinced him of the artistic merits of t hese works, and 
led him to put forward the theory of an 11 ••• elementary artistic pro-
cess ... '' which he believed was inherent in all men. (Cardinal; 1972, 
p. 19.) This process, he bel ieved, came naturally to the fore in these 
patients, due to their solipsismic tendencies which shut out all outside 
interference, thus allowing for the spontaneous emergence of this crea-
tive mode. Prinzhorn believed that sch izophrenia, in particular, erected 
a barrier between the sufferer and the world at large, resulting in a 
degree of isolation which allowed for the emergence of the sufferers cre-
ative urges. The only other instances of relatively spontaneous creat ion 
occurred, he thought, in children, and in some folk art tradit ions. 
Prinzhorn further believed, that the only two real differences between a 
sch izophrenic patient and a 'sane' artist were, firstly, that unlike the 
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1Sane 1 artist, the schizophrenic worked from a position of autistic iso-
lation, and second ly , that it was only as a result of what he called the 
fine art world1s 11 • • • obsolete dogmatism 11 , that works by schizophrenic 
patients were not accepted as true works of art. (Prinzhorn; 1972, 
p.274.) 
Both Dubuffet and Prinzhorn came to the belief that tradition and train-
ing acted therefore, only as external stimul i to man 1 s creative urges, 
which, provided with the right conditions would emerge. Prinzhorn be-
lieved that the works he col lected had been created under the right con-
ditions which had subsequently allowed the 11 •• • primeval process, which 
incorporates the subconcious components in an almost pure form, ... 11 
to come to the fore. (Prinzhorn; 1972, p.274 .) Prinzhorn in fact, be-
lieved that the s imilarities between works in his collection and works 
by primitives, were so pronounced, that it was often difficult to tel l 
the two apart. The similarit ies existed for him in their configurations 
and use of motifs , as well as s imilar formal arrangements. 
A study, 11 Regarding Evolution Psychology 111 , published in 1915, provided 
Prinzhorn with further evidence to support his argument. It was con-
cerned with the evolution of all psychic life, and in particular, the 
psychic life of children, primitives and the mentally ill. Its object 
was to prove that all psychic phenomenon are subject to uniform or com-
mon laws, which are constant and universal, that is, that similarities 
exist between all psychic development, no matter where or ·when it oc-
curred. Prinzhorn believed that he could corroborate this theory by 
1. Kreuger, K. Leipzig, 1915. 
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comparing works from his collection to the works of primitive cultures. 
His argument was that, " ... when numerous sculptures by the mentally ill 
prove to have the closest formal and expressive resemblance to numerous 
sculptures by primitives, and neither used models, we see a strong argu-
ment favouring the idea that there are concepts common to humanity, and 
against the idea of wandering concepts spread between tribes and peoples 
by direct contact." (Prinzhorn; 1972, p.254.) He believed that this 
could explain how a mental patient worki ng in total isolation from the 
outside world, and a primitive sculptor from Africa, could arrive at a 
similar formal arrangement when sculpting a human effigy. 
The idea of concepts common to humanity can be more clear ly understood 
by relating them to the instinctive behaviour (physiological urges) with 
which we are all familiar . These phenomenon, according to Jung, " . .. 
manifest themselves in fantasies and often reveal their presence only 
by symbolic images." (Jung; 1978, p.58.) It i s these symbols and fan-
tasies, often produced by our unconscious that are called archetypes. 
"These are without known origin; and they reproduce themselves in any 
time or in any part of the world - even where transmission by direct 
descent or 'cross fertilization' through migration must be ruled out." 
(Jung; 1978, p.58.) 
Our minds, like our bodies, have developed along an evolutionary path 
from archaic man (whose psyche was still close to that of the animal) 
to the present. It is therefore also still linked to the unconscious 
mind of our ancestors. For this reason, Jung believed that; "The ex-
perienced investigator of the mind can similarly see the analogies be-
tween the dream pictures of modern man and the products of the primitive 
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mind, its 'col lective images' , and its mythological motifs. 11 (Jung; 
1978, p.57.) These symbols, produced from our 'collective unconscious', 
are part of the same symbol making capacity inherent to the primiti~es 
which were given expression in their rituals, are also part of our 11 in-
stinctual psyche", which has to be realized and embraced by our con-
sc ious minds. 
To suppress such instincts can lead to the destruction of a psyche, for 
it is these very same; 11 Suppressed and wounded instincts ... [that] .. . 
are the dangers threatening civilized man; ... 11 says Aniela Jaffe1. 
11 The familiar dream in which the dreamer is 'pursued by an animal nearly 
always indicates that an instinct has been split off from the conscious-
ness and ought to be (or is trying to be) readmitted and integrated into 
life. The more dangerous the behaviour of the animal in the dream, the 
more unconscious is the primitive and instinctual soul of the dreamer, 
and the more imperative is its integration into his life if some irrepa-
rable evil is to be forestalled. 11 (Jaffe; 1978, p.266.) 
Dubuffet no doubt recognized the need, and the urgency, with which these 
symbols need to find expression in our daily lives when he referred to, 
the annihilation of our primal unity 11 ••• by artificial conventions and 
repressions of so called civilisation .... 11 (Rowell; 1973, p.17.) It is, 
as Jung puts it, 11 • • • precisely the loss of connection with the past, 
our uprootedness, which has given rise to the 'discontents' of civilisa-
t ion and to such a flurry and haste that we live more in the future and 
its chimerical promises of a golden age than in the present, with which 
1. Psychoanalyst and the late Dr. Jung's private secretary and biogra-
pher. 
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our whole evolutionary background has not yet caught up." (Jung; 1985, 
p. 263.) 
Dubuffet therefore looked to primitive man, who distrusted the states of 
reason and logic, qualities of ours which are largely responsible for our 
present situation. He looked at ways in which to re-experience the rich 
representational mode known to the primitives. As a result, he became 
extremely interested in Dr. Prinzhorn's belief that a similarity existed 
between the creative urge that drove a mentally ill person, and the crea-
tive instinct that fueled the primitive artist. He came to regard mad-
ness, implying as it does, a non-conformist individual attitude, as a 
barrier which protected against cultural conditioning, which he believes 
has progressively weakened Western man's creative instincts. In the men-
tal patient, he found evidence of what he called the 'solid wall' of in-
sanity, a condition which he felt had allowed these people the space to 
develop their own internal cosmos, unaffected by the outside worlds norms 
and values. 
These conditions, Dubuffet believed, allowed the patient I artist to in-
vent his own personal language of form, one that was as little indebted 
to cultural models as humanly possible. Dubuffet therefore proclaimed 
the advantages of working from a position of isolation, a position which 
he believed left the artist free to invent his own language, make up his 
own rules, and if necessary invent his own surrogate world. He stated 
therefore that the artists" ... goal ... [should} · · not be communica-
tion with an audience but a closed circuit dialogue with himself . ... " 
(Rowell; 1973, p. 21.) 
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Following Dr. Prinzhorn's example, Dubuffet decided to begin his own 
collection of nonconformist art in 1945. His intention was to collect 
works by the uneducated, the untrained and the insane. Also to be in-
cluded in this collection were artists like the medium Madge Gill 1, who 
believed that a spirit guided her in her work. This collection, which 
Dubuffet referred to as Art brut, led eventually to the establishment of 
the "Compagnie de l'Art brut 11 in 1948. Michel Tapie, Jean Paulhan and 
Andre Breton, corroborated with Dubuffet in this venture and the first 
exhibition of Art brut entitled 11 Art in the Raw Preferred to Cultural 
Art 11 , was held at the Galerie Drouin in Paris the following year. The 
Compagnie's aims were, 11 ••• to seek out artistic productions from ob-
scure people, which display a special character of personal invention, 
spontaneity and freedom with regard to conventions and accepted habits. 11 
(Maclagan; 1987, p.13.) 
The collection came to include drawings, paintings, embroideries etc., 
as well as three-dimensional modelled and sculpted figures, which, stip-
ulated Dubuffet, differed from what is generally referred to as Naive 
painting or Surrealist art. Both of these he saw as mere derivatives 
of cultural art. Art brut on the other hand, he saw as, " ... propo-
sitions of themselves unpredictable and wholly invented both in med-
ium ... and in their inspiration. 11 (Rowell; 1973, p.20.) 
Once again Dubuffet felt that the most essential contributing factor 
1. Following the birth of a still-born girl in 1919 during which she 
herself almost died, Madge Gill began to draw, embroider and to knit. 
She claimed she was guided in her work by a spirit called Myrninerest, 
and refused to sell her work, believing that it belonged to her spirit 
guide. When she died at the age of seventy seven , she left hundreds of 
drawings (some up to thirty-five feet long) in wardrobes and under beds. 
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in the creation of these works was that most of these artists had worked 
from i solated positions, be it the alienated existence of a patient in 
a mental asylum, or the sel f imposed isolat ion of an artist like Henry 
Darger. Darger lived and worked alone in the same room for some forty 
years, subsisting on social security until his death in 1972. Dubuffet 
believed that this alienation had allowed these artists the opportunity 
to recreate their world in a fashion more satisfying to their needs , 
that is, it allowed t hem to manipulate their world rather than visa 
versa. 
Like Prinzhorn, Dubuffet was emphatic that these works were not to be 
referred to as psychopathic art but 11 ••• works done by people unconta-
minated by artistic culture, works in which mimicry, ... plays little or 
no part, with the result that their makers draw all (subjects, choice of 
material used, means of transposition, rhythms, manner of writing, etc . ) 
from their own being and not from hangovers of classical or fashionable 
art. We witness here the artistic process in all its purity, raw, re-
invented on all levels by the maker, starting solely from his own impul-
ses .... 11 (Fried; 1985, p.32.) 
In order to more accurately define the nature of these works, let us 
list those which do not fall into the category of Art brut . Firstly, 
European Folk arts e.g. Sicilian cart painting, which submits to cul-
tural standards rather than individual caprice. Secondly, all 'Naive' 
art, whose creators paint to order, in that, they displ ay a specific 
social function and will i ngly, occupy a niche that art history has ac -
corded them. Thirdly, the art of prisoners which may seem contradictory 
if one considers their condition, that is, one of internment, isol ation 
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and anti-social attitudes. The prison however is experienced more as 
a physical restraint rather than as a psychic distance from the outside 
world. Its subculture and subsequently its art therefore, makes use of 
the stereotypes of a sha red mode of li fe, and expresses the prisoners 
single most important col lective desire, namely, to escape and rejoin 
the outside world. These common attributes exclude this work from Art 
brut. 
In contrast to the above examples , Art brut has been described as the 
"pure in heart," especially when one compares it to qualities like am-
bition, career i sm , commercial i sm and opportunism, which abound in the 
profess ional art world . (Willing; 1987, p.7.) Art brut i s characteri zed 
by works which are borne out of the inner compulsions of artists who have 
had no f ormal art training , and who live in positions of complete or re-
lative isolation . "Only what grows naturally and is projected spontan-
eously from within the psychic depths of the art i st can be considered 
valid as original form: all else remains tainted or distorted by idees 
recues." (Card i nal; 1972, p.29. ) , 
Dubuffet therefore looked to art i sts who display a total disregard for 
any form of communication between themselves and the publ ic. Such art-
ists, sa id he, would by nature be anti-social and alienated, a condi-
tion which would afford them the freedom to invent their own language 
and to make up their own rules . Their" ... goal," he said, "is not 
communication but a closed-circuit dialogue with .. . [themselves] 
(or wi th an imaginary audience of ... [their] . .. own making), ... . " 
(Rowell; 1973, p.21.) 
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The question arises though, of whether then an artist should exhibit 
his works, once a position of isolation had been successfully reached 
and maintained? The problem concedes two alternatives, namely, 
i) the artist should exhibit his work so as to prove (or disprove) 
the advantages of self imposed alienation, or 
ii) the artist should refuse to show any of his work, and thereby 
cement his isolation officially. 
Roger Cardinal suggested that the answer might lie in the creation of 
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••• a mode of publication that stops short of publicity, a manner of 
communicating that does not utilize the insidious machinery of culture 
in order to reach an audience." (Cardinal; 1972, p.33.) As an example, 
he cites the case of artist Scottie Wilson, who sold his drawings in the 
street , two at a time, like kippers. 
Dubuffet does not offer a solution, but regrets that his own success has 
placed him in contradiction to his own beli efs. 11 I 1 ve always thought 
that the most powerful and vital art-like Art brut - is the one that 
society has the most trouble accepting. 11 , he said. 11 Well, my success 
has put me in an uncomfortable position. In fact, ever since my work 
started to get known, I 1 ve lived in contradiction with my own beliefs. 11 
(Peppiatt; 1977 , p.68.) He reiterates however, that only when art 
ceases to be considered as an item of value through which the artist 
can gain reward, will art take on its true identity as the expression 
of the innermost self. 
During his own life, Dubuffet avoided visiting galleries or attending 
exhibitions. He felt that it was unhealthy to keep looking at other 
33 
peoples work, in that, it could intefere with ones own. By contrast, 
he sought contact with unknowns, believing t hem to be the real innova-
tors for they had turned their backs on the system, and devoted them-
selves to the process of self discovery, by remaining unaffected by 
any outside influences or ulterior motives. 
Dubuffet concluded thus, that the only position from which an artist 
might create completely freely, that is, spontaneously and unaffected 
by cultural models, was, from a deconditioned and relatively isolated 
s ite : 11 ••• if" says Dubuffet, "we can free ourselves of the condition-
ing, the mind can get to work on the image that has come up, and make 
it not only realistic but even necessary and convincing, that is the 
painters job." (Novarina; 1983, p.22.) He was the first to admit that 
to decondition oneself entirely is impossible , however, he still believed 
that by isolating himself from the art world, he could rediscover what 
he called, " ... a kind of innocent magical art", examples of which he 
found in works by mentally disturbed pat i ents. (Ragon; 1959, p.52.) 
Dubuffet finally committed himself to painting at the age of fourty one 
after abandoning two earlier attempts in 1918 and later in 1934. One 
of the reasons he gave for these delays was the need to 11 ••• wipe away 
the old before making the new 11 , that is, he felt the need to firstly 
purge himself of any influences present. (Grazioli; 1983, p.16.) It is 
true that there were other contributing factors such as his eventual fin-
ancial security which meant that he did not have to entertain the notion 
of sel ling his work, but this alone does not explain the reason for his 
non-conformist attitudes. It serves rather to illustrate the point he 
was making, namely 1 that freedom obtained at any cost enhances ones cha-
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ces at producing highly original works. He does not specify the means 
to freedom only that it is essential to the spirit of creativity. 
Dubuffet•s conclusion can be seen as a personal attempt to rebuild what 
Kandi nsky call ed•• ... the 1 i fe of the soul and the spirit of the twen-
tieth century. 11 (Rookmaaker; 1970, p.108.) It was an attempt to lift 
himself out of the technocratic and bureaucratic tangle that has become 
our modern world and to discover another world outside the one governed 
by naturalistic law and empiricism. Science as mentioned cannot deal 
with the immeasurable or the invisible, and states of mind or conscious-
nesses that cannot be proved. 
It has been suggested that; 11 There . . . [are] ... , however, . . . strong 
empirical reason[s] why we should cultivate thoughts that can never be 
proved .... Man positively needs general ideas and convictions that will 
give a meaning to his life and enable him to find a place for himself 
in the universe. 11 (Jung; 1978, p.76.) In the light of this statement, 
Dubuffet has left the 11 intermediary stage•• of collectivisims, and struck 
out and involved himself with ideas and actions, which for the most part, 
seem irreconcilable with reality and riddled with conflict. But it is 
this very agent of conflict, says Jung, which 11 ••• always presupposes a 
higher sense of responsibility. It is this very quality which keeps 
its possessor from accepting the decision of a collectivity. 11 (Jung; 
1985, p. 378.) Most of all though, Dubuffet through reform by retro-
gression hoped to find new meanings pertaining to his existence on 
earth. 
One of the ways to find meaning, it is thought, is to embrace myth, not 
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the manufactured myth's of the collectivism's, but the myths resoundent 
in man himself, those that have always and will always be present in, 
and therefore accessable to , all mankind. This need for meaning and 
myth is crucial to modern man, and Jung understood this precisely when 
he wrote; "Meaningless inhibits fullness of life and is therefore equi-
valent to illness. Meaning makes a great many things endurable- per-
haps everything. No science will ever replace myth, and a myth cannot 
be made out of science . . . It is not we who invent myth ... it confronts 
us ... . " (Jung; 1985, p.373.) 
To understand this point i s to understand why Dubuffet became so inte-
rested in Dr. Prinzhorn's observations regarding what he referred to 
as, the "hieroglyphic character" of the works in his collection. (Pri-
nzhorn; 1972, p.233.) The patient I artist invents a configuration, he 
said, which has special meaning for him, the key to which is in most 
cases derived from the patients" ... own philosophical battles with in-
stincts and cultural forces, .... 11 (Prinzhorn; 1972, p.237. ) Dubuffet 
concluded from this that, these artist I patients were in touch with the 
same instinctual forces that are common to all men (except for their 
repression in modern times) and especially those which were known and 
expressed in the art of the primitive. 
Dubuffet tried in his work therefore, to reach a similar vein of instinct 
by displaying a renewal of natural aesthetic sensibilities, similar to 
those which i-nspired the primitives. This he attempted by, firstly, de-
claring the Western notion of beauty invalid, and secondly, by using sub-
ject matter which in most instances is drawn from material so familiar, 
it has been passed over, but nevertheless exists in profusion all around 
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us, from ugly men and women, to unswept gutters in the street. 
In 1950, Dubuffet completed a series of works entitled "Bodies of Lad-
ies". These seemingly grotesque women were unlike anything seen before 
in the tradition of the nude. They displayed what was considered to 
some, a distressing eroticism, and seemingly exhibited a total lack of 
respect for the female form. They were to Dubuffet however, more naked 
than nature. "A man must be honest," he said,"No Veils! No Make-be-
lieve! Naked; all things at their worst." (Franzke; 1976, p.156.) He 
denied however, that there is anythi ng out of the ordinary in his work, 
and admits to rigorously banning anything unusual from his register. 
Dubuffet also not only chooses subject matter that may seem banal and 
crude, but also uses only the most common materials in his composi-
tions. He has, for example, worked with materials such as gravel, 
cement, sand , leaves, bark, banana peels and butterfly wings at var-
ious stages. He explains; "I have always liked - it i s a kind of 
vice - to make use only of the most common materials, those one does 
not think of at first because they are the commonplace and close to us 
and appear unsuitable for any use." (Ragon; 1959, p.43.) 
To this end he also denied" ... that there are beautiful colours and 
ugly colour s, beautiful shapes and others that are not. I am convinced 
that any object, any place without distinction can become a key of en-
chantment for the mind according to the way one looks at it and the as-
sociations of ideas to which one links it. " (Cardinal; 1972, p.34.) 
By attempting to abolish all aesthetical distinctions, Dubuffet aligned 
himself to ancient Alchemical texts by acknowledging, and accepting, 
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what has been referred to as, the "secret soul of thingS 11 or, the "spi-
rit in matter." (Jaffe; 1978, p.291.) His object was, to re-establi sh 
a common bond between man and his environment, that is, to recognize the 
value of all objects, persons, things etc., as well as their inter-depen-
dence on each other. 
He wished for man to be returned into a state of similtude with his en-
vironment. A position from which he could experience the life forces 
common to all that experience life on this earth, and which have mani-
fested themselves in mans dreams since he first walked this planet. 
He has attempted to portray this in his painting by trying to abolish 
all distinctions between an ob.iect and its surroundings, by eliminating 
pictorial interspacial relati onships. Hi s inclination is rather, to 
join together real, as well as invisible inventions, that is, objects 
of the imagination. He feels that by eliminating the pictorial and 
spacial categories so fundamental to Western art, he is able to create 
a continuous undifferentiated universe in which mobility (enhanced by 
horizontal as opposed to vertical movement) is greatly increased. His 
object is therefore, to present all inter-related parts which combine 
to form the whole, simultaneously. 
So, unlike many of his contemporaries e.g. Pollock, Kline, Newman and 
Motherwell, Dubuffet did not discard the subject in its surroundings. 
His painting between 1943 and 1950 is therefore, mostly concerned with 
the human figure, and the interaction with its surrounding space. This 
1 space 1 he interprets by re-emphasizing the picture plane as a two-dimen-
sional surface on which the figure exists either as a cut out (1944) or, 
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as incised into the background (1945- 47). The result is, that in his 
"Corps de dames" series of 1950- 51, the figure exists as an essentially 
flattened form, which at times is bled into the background, reaffirming 
his rejection of traditional space and perspective. 
This trend became even more apparent in the 60's, during which phase, the 
human figure gave way to the i !logical representation of 11 four-leg-
ged, two-dimensional ... "tables. (Rowell; 1973, p.24.) The object is 
flattened here to the extreme, the table top tilts until it forms a uni-
form plane with that of the paintings surface, negating the existence of 
illusionistic space. Of these paintings he said, " .. • let the surface 
speak of its own language and not an artificial language of three-dimen-
sional space which is not proper to it .... " (Rowell; 1973, p.24.) 
This cycle culminated wi th the "Hourloupe" paintings of 1969. With this 
series he felt he had succeeded in destroying all categories, that is, 
our mental classifications of objects or concepts into e.g. a tree, a 
figure, a cloud. What he felt he had achieved was the reduction of all 
things, be they visible or invent ions of the imagination, to what he 
termed, the" ... lowest common denominator and restitute[d] a continuous 
undifferentiated universe, .... " (Rowell; 1973, p.25.) 
With this cycle, Dubuffet concluded his search f or a metaphysical realm 
behind the visible, a world of no di sti nctions, or as it has been called, 
a world of "primordial ambiguity". During 1969, he developed these pain-
tings into a series of sculptures which he called simulacre's, and with 
which he built three-dimensional examples of what he had achieved in 
paint. It was into such worlds, that he believed man could successfully 
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be reintroduced. 
The paradox though, is that Dubuffet's re-invented world, sparked off as 
it was by a reaction against the laws of empiricism and the states of 
reason and logic, has proved itself to be constant with the new concept 
of reality, as put forward by Nuclear physics. The reality of our 'real' 
world, as determined by Classical physics, has now given way to a new 
concept of reality which shows, it is said, that 11 ••• mass and energy, 
wave and particle, have proved to be interchangeable ... [and that] ... 
the laws of cause and effect have become valid only up to a certain 
point" , resul tin9 in the realization of 11 ••• a new, totally different, 
and irrational reality ... behind the reality of our 'natural' world 
... ", of which, Dubuffet's simulacre's are graphic representations. 
(Jaffe; 1978, p.303.) Their forms, are as meandering and as relative, 
equal and subject to change, as our new world has turned out to be, 
thereby fulfilling his initial intention that it be a world" ... without 
categories ... [and] ... without given values and hierarchies ; .... 11 (Row-
ell; 1973, p.19.) It therefore envelops man, and can in turn be ex-
perienced resplendent with the mysteries which were once so essential 
to the well being of our spirits. Those, which have long since been 
banished from conscious life to lie dormant and suppressed, emerging 
only as the anxieties of modern man. 
Dubuffet's reaction to our modern society has, therefore, been to dis-
tance himself from it ( 11 lf soc iety does not satisfy ... man's spiritual 
needs ... the artist is forced to withdraw into himself, ... (Verstra~te; 
n.d., abstract.)) in order to escape from its inhibiting conformity, and so, 
to set about re-inventing an artform which could, once again, allow for 
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an interplay between our inner repressed psychic heritage and our outer 
world experiences, through the understanding and manipulation of its 
symbolic content. 
This self-imposed alienation from society, can therefore, be regarded 
as a responsible act, in that, it entailed his correct identification 
of Western societies failure to meet the spiritual needs and aspira-
tions of modern man . In part icu lar, he recognized the plight of the 
artist whom he believed, had been put into a position whereby he was 
forced to conform to society 1 s norms, and to cater to its taste if he 
was to survive. 
If, on the evidence presented, we agree that this be the case, then his 
1 negative 1 response to society can be seen as a responsible one, in 
that, he chose to serve arts true function, which I believe (to answer 
Verstra~te) is, to serve man in all the complexity of his humanity, 
rather than to serve society in its 1 particular 1 • (Verstra~te; n.d., 
p.2.) 
CONCLUSION 
Before attempting to reach any conclusion regarding the validity and 
appropriateness of Dubuffet 1 s views, I think it is necessary to attempt 
to answer some of the criticisms which have been leveled a9ainst him. 
The severeness of his ideas on alienation, as set out in his anticul-
t ural stance, seen in the context of his own subsequent lifestyle, 
have led many to brand him as a hypocrit for living in contradiction 
to his own beliefs, and therefore also unworthy of any serious consid-
eration. 
It is true, that during his lifetime, Dubuffet did indeed win much art-
istic recognition, not to mention substantial financial reward. He has, 
in fact, been labelled as one of the leaders of the new spirit in Euro-
pean painting from the 1940 1 s until the present and, together with Gia-
cometti , was seen as a leading influence in t he revival of figurative 
art, in the face of the American trend s of Abstract Expressionism. 
Hi s importance as an artist is therefore self evident, but, regarding 
the so-called contradictions, I believe them to exist only at the junc-
ture where a vibrantly new, non-conformist approa(h, clashed headlong 
with established cultural proceedures. The problem was, that not only 
did Dubuffet 1 s approach entail a new normative code, but also, through 
a renewal and a re-discovery of a vibrantly original representational 
mode, contained a new exciting line of artistic development which it-
self, could not be ignored. It came therefore to the attention of the 
cultural arbitrators who slot artists, like Dubuffet, into a nook set 
aside for reaction i sts. 
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In attempting to maintain its equilibrium, the system simu ltaneously 
subdues and absorbs the protagonist. An artist, like Dubuffet, who 
cannot be ignored, is thus slotted into a niche alongside the mains-
tream movements thereby according him the recognition of a place in 
history. The result is, that like many other non-conformist, anti-
establishment movements from Romanticism to Dada, Dubuffet too, has 
been awarded an honoury position in the very museums and galler ies 
that he sought to avoid from the outset. 
The other great problem and paradox he was faced with, was, that having 
identified the fact that the Art brut artists degree of isolation from 
society freed him from inhibiting agents thereby stimulating a re-awake-
ning of an inherent creative urge,closer to the artistic mode of a pr im-
itive, Dubuffet had to approach a similar position from the outside. 
This means, deliberately, for, he was neither mad nor uneducated. He 
therefore had to make use of his intel lect, and especially his art, to 
distance himself from accepted values and aesthetic practises. This led 
to the criticism that he was" ... able to decerebrate himself only to 
the point of using logic to transcend logic. 11 (New International; 1967, 
p.1389.) 
For me, however, the strength of these ideas and attitudes lies in the 
fact that they are so idealistic. Any philosophy that propagates as 
its central theme, radical changes to , and departures from the present 
value systems which form the basic underlying structures of Western Soc-
ieties, through a breakdown in communication between its members, can 
only be termed idealistic. This comes back to what I included on the 
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subject of cultivating thoughts that can never be proved1. Dubuffet's 
ideas fall into this category, their one great advantage being there-
fore, that because of their idealism, it would be hard to turn them into 
a dogma, that is, we could never take them on for ourselves and make use 
of them, as we would another collective ideology. Their elusive nature 
prohibits this. 
On the other hand though, this does not mean that we cannot learn from 
them. His ideas on a position of isolation can, in this instance, be 
regarded more in the metaphorical sense, than seen as a lonely outpost 
miles from anywhere. He himse lf warned that; "Art brut, savagery, free-
dom, these should not be conceived as places, nor above all as fixed 
places, but as directions, aspirations, tendencies." (Cardinal; 1972, 
p. 32. ) 
He believed the ideal pole to reflect a situation in which we (the pub-
lic) share nothing with the artist, nor can he offer us anything, for 
what is lacking is the basis of a dialogue between us. Such a position 
would, I admit, be virtually impossible for the ordinary socialized art-
ist to reach , or even want to reach. Nevertheless, I believe that by 
initiating even the slightest degree of isolation from, or even by ack-
nowledging the fact, that culture can and does act as an inhibiting ag-
ent, we could visualize and even actualize a greater degree of individ-
uality and freedom. 
To conclude then, I think that Dubuffet's ideas and concepts are valid 
1. See page 34. 
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and noteworthy, if only for the fact that they highlight some of the 
difficulties facing the artist in present day societies. For this rea-
son Dubuffet 1 s influence will, I believe, be an ongoing phenomena. His 
words and ideas will continue to stimulate and excite the passions in 
the face of restrictive orders . 11 The universe is a vast dance, 11 he said , 
11 and thought grasps nothing unless i t dances, too . It gets lost when 
it tries to rely on fixed points: north, plus and minus, top and bottom. 
The fixed points are dancing; the north i s dancing . Thought has no 
chance of learning anything until it learns how t o join the dance. '' 
(Novarina; 1983, p.23.) 
APPENDIX 
THE ANTICULTURAL POSITIONS 
These positions were compiled from Dubuffet's notes for a lecture, given 
by him, at the Arts Club of Chicago on December 20, 1951. 
Position One 
One of the principal characteristics of Western 
culture is the belief that the nature of man is very 
different from the nature of other beings of the world. 
Custom has it that man cannot be identif ied, or 
compared in the least, with elements such as winds, 
trees, rivers - except humorously, and for poetic 
rhetorical figures. The Western man has, at last, 
a great contempt, for trees and rivers, and hates to be 
like them. On the contrary, the so called primitive 
man loves and admires trees and rivers, and has a 
great pleasure to be like them. He believes in a real 
similitude between man and trees and rivers. 
He has a very strong sense of continuity of all 
things, and especially between man and the rest of 
t he world. Those primitive societ ies have surely 
much more respect than Western man for every 
being of the world; they have a feeling that the man 
is not the owner of the beings, but only one of them 
among the others. 
Position Two 
My second point of disagreement with occidental 
culture is the following one. 'Western man believes 
that the things he thinks exist outside exactly in the 
same way he thinks of them. He is convinced that the 
shape of the world is the same shape as his reason. 
He believes very strongly the basis of his reason 
is well founded , and especially the basis of his logic. 
But the primitive man has rather an idea of 
weakness of reason and logic, and believes rather 
in other ways of getting knowledge of thi ngs. 
That is why he has so much esteem and so much 
admiration for the states of mind which we call 
madness. I must dec lare I have a great interest for 
madness; and I am convinced art has much to 
do with madness.' 
Position Three 
Now, third point. I want to talk about the great 
respect occidental culture has for elaborated ideas. 
I don't regard elaborated ideas as the best part 
of human function . I think ideas are rather a 
weakened rung in the ladder of mental process: 
something like a landing where the mental processes 
become impoverished, like an outside crust 
caused by coo l ing . Ideas are like steam condensed 
into water by touching the level of reason and logic. 
I don't think the greatest value of mental function 
is to be found at this l anding of ideas; and it is 
not at this landing that it interests me. aim rather to 
capture the thought at a point of its development 
prior to this landing of elaborated ideas. 
The whole art, the whole literature and the whole 
philosophy of Occident , rest on the landing of 
elaborated ideas. But my own art, and my own 
philosophy, lean entirely on stages more underground. 
I try always to catch the mental process at the 
deeper point of its roots, where, I am sure, the sap 
is much richer . 
Position Four 
Now, fourth. Occidental culture is very fond of 
analysis, and I have no taste for analysis, and no 
confidence in it. One thinks everything can be known 
by way of dismantling it or dissecting it into all its 
parts, and studying separately each of these parts. 
My own feeling is quite different. I am more 
disposed, on the contrary, to always recompose 
things. As soon as an object has been cut only into 
two parts, I have the impression it is lost for my 
study, I am further removed from this object instead 
of being nearer to it. 
I have a very strong feeling that the sum of the parts 
does not equal the whole. 
My inclination leads me, when I want to see 
something really well, to regard it with its sur-
roundings, whole. If I want to know this pencil on 
the tabl e, I don't look straight on the pencil, 
I look on the middle of the room, try ing to include 
in my glance as many objects as possible. 
If there is a tree in the country, I don't bring it into 
my laboratory to look at it under my microscope, 
because I think the wind which blows through its 
leaves i s absolutely necessary for the knowledge of 
the tree and cannot be separated from it. Also 
the birds which are in the branches, and even the 
song of these birds. My turn of mind is to join 
always more things surrounding the tree, and 
further, always more of the things which surround 
the things which surround the tree. 
have been a long time on this point, because 
think this turn of mind is an important factor of the 
aspect of my art. 
Position Five 
The fifth point, now, is that our culture is based 
on an enormous confidence in the language - and 
especially the written language; and belief in its 
ability to translate and elaborate thought. That 
appears to me a misapprehension. have the im-
pression, language is a rough, very rough stenog-
raphy, a system of algebraic signs very rudimentary, 
which impairs thought instead of helping it. 
Speech is more concrete, animated by the sound of 
the voice, intonations, a cough, and even making 
a face and mimicry, and it seems to me more 
effective. Written language seems to me a bad 
instrument. As an instrument of expression, it 
seems to deliver only a dead remnant of thought, 
more or less as clinkers from the fire. As an 
instrument of elaboration, it seems to overload 
thought and fal s ify it. 
I believe (and here I am in accord with the so-
called primitive civilizations) that painting is 
concrete than the written words, and is a much 
more 
more rich instrument than it for the expression and 
elaboration of thought. 
I have just said, what interests me, in thought, 
i s not the instant of transformation into formal ideas, 
but the moments preceding that. 
My painting can be regarded as a tentative 
language fitting for these areas of thought. 
Position Six 
I come to my sixth and last point, and I intend now to 
speak of the notion of beauty adopted by occidental 
culture. 
I want to begin by tel ling you in which my own 
conception differs from the usual one. The latter 
believes that there are beautiful objects and ugly 
objects, beautiful persons and ug ly persons, 
beautiful places and ugly places, and so forth. 
Not I. I believe beauty is nowhere. I consider 
this notion of beauty as completely fal se. I refuse 
absolutely to assent to this idea that there are ugly 
persons and ugly objects. This idea is for me 
stifling and revolting. 
I think the Greeks are the ones, first, to purport 
that certain objects are more beautiful than others. 
The so-cal l ed savage nations don 1t beli eve in that at 
all. They don 1 t understand when you speak to them 
of beauty. 
This is the rea son one calls them savage. The 
Western man gives the name of savage to one who 
doesn 1t understand that beautiful things and 
ugly thi ng s exist , and who doesn 1t care for that at all. 
What is strange is that, for centuries and centuries, 
and still now more than ever, the men of occident 
dispute which are the beautiful things and which 
are the ugly ones. All are certain that beauty 
exists without doubt, but one cannot find two who 
agree about the objects which are endowed. 
And from one century to the next, it changes. The 
occidental culture declares beautiful, in each century, 
what is declared ugly in the preceding one. 
The rationalization of that is that beauty exists 
sure ly, but it is hidden from view for many persons. 
To perceive beauty requires a certain special sense, 
and most people have not this sense. 
One believes also it is possible to develop this 
sense, by doing exercises, and even to make it 
appear in persons who are not gifted with th is sense. 
There are schools for that . 
The teacher, in these sc hools, states to his pupils 
that there is, without doubt, a beauty of things, 
but he has to add that people dispute which things 
are endowed with that, and have so far never 
succeeded in establ ishing it firmly. He invites his 
pupils to examine the question in their turn, and so, 
from generation to generation, the dispute continues. 
This idea of beauty is however one of the things 
our culture prizes most, and it is customary 
to consider this belief in beauty, and the respect 
for this beauty, as the ultimate justification of 
Western civilization, and the principle of civilization 
itself is involved with this notion of beauty. 
I find this idea of beauty a meager and not very 
ingenious invention, and especially not very 
encouraging for man. It is distressing to think about 
people deprived of beauty because they have 
not a straight nose, or are too corpu l ent, or too old. 
I find even this idea that the world we live in i s 
made up of ninety percent ugly things and ugly 
places, while things and places endowed with 
beauty are very rare and very difficult to meet , 
I must say, I find this idea not very exciting. It seems 
to me that the Western man will not suffer a great loss 
if it loses this idea. On the contrary, if he becomes 
aware that there is no ug ly object nor ugly person 
in this world, and that any object of the world is able 
to become for any man a way of fascination and 
illumination, he will have made a good catch. I think 
such an idea will enrich life more than the Greek 
idea of beauty. 
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